Summary
Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow an attacker to obtain full, root access over the device in multiple ways. Initial footholds through S-Web interface software vulnerabilities could allow an attacker to obtain a level of control over the PLC's functions only the vendor typically has access to. This includes the ability to reset the PLC, upload arbitrary files / execute code, and change parameters for protective functions that can pose a range of availability and safety risks to the power system the PLC is configured to control (based on the specific implementation). Further exploitation of the underlying PLC misconfigurations can allow an attacker to trivially escalate privileges to OS root through either the S-Web vulnerabilities or FTP and SSH misconfigurations.
Vulnerabilities 7
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Critical 9.9
Secheron SEPCOS Control and Protection Relay
The www-data (Apache web server) account is configured to run sudo with no password for many commands (including /bin/sh and /bin/bash).
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Critical 9.8
Secheron SEPCOS Control and Protection Relay
Weak default root user credentials allow remote attackers to easily obtain OS superuser privileges over the open TCP port for SSH.
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Critical 9.8
Secheron SEPCOS Control and Protection Relay
An attacker with weak credentials could access the TCP port via an open FTP port, allowing an attacker to read sensitive files and write to remotely executable directories.
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Critical 9.4
Secheron SEPCOS Control and Protection Relay
Controls limiting uploads to certain file extensions may be bypassed. This could allow an attacker to intercept the initial file upload page response and modify the associated code. This modified code can be forwarded and used by a script loaded later in the …
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Critical 9.4
Secheron SEPCOS Control and Protection Relay
Client-side JavaScript controls may be bypassed to change user credentials and permissions without authentication, including a “root” user level meant only for the vendor. Web server root level access allows for changing of safety critical parameters.
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High 7.5
Secheron SEPCOS Control and Protection Relay
Client-side JavaScript controls may be bypassed by directly running a JS function to reboot the PLC (e.g., from the browser console) or by loading the corresponding, browser accessible PHP script
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Medium 6.5
Secheron SEPCOS Control and Protection Relay
The default password for the web application’s root user (the vendor’s private account) was weak and the MD5 hash was used to crack the password using a widely available open-source tool.
Revision history
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#1
Publication Date
References
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ICS Advisory ICSA-22-174-03 Web Version
https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-22-174-03
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Recommended Practices
https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/alerts/ICS-ALERT-10-301-01
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Recommended Practices
https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
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Recommended Practices
https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/tips/ICS-TIP-12-146-01B