Summary
Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow an attacker with physical access to the device to modify system configurations, obtain access to sensitive information, or access components of the system.
Vulnerabilities 7
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Medium 5.4
Lack of USB Whitelisting
The FACSChorus workstation operating system does not restrict what devices can interact with its USB ports. If exploited, a threat actor with physical access to the workstation could gain access to system information and potentially exfiltrate data.
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Medium 5.2
Lack of Adequate BIOS Authentication
There is no BIOS password on the FACSChorus workstation. A threat actor with physical access to the workstation can potentially exploit this vulnerability to access the BIOS configuration and modify the drive boot order and BIOS pre-boot authentication.
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Medium 4.1
Hardcoded Secrets
The FACSChorus software contains sensitive information stored in plaintext. A threat actor could gain hardcoded secrets used by the application, which include tokens and passwords for administrative accounts.
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Medium 4.1
Overly Permissive Access Policy
The FACSChorus software database can be accessed directly with the privileges of the currently logged-in user. A threat actor with physical access could potentially gain credentials, which could be used to alter or destroy data stored in the database.
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Low 3.8
Unsecure Identity Verification
The Operating System hosting the FACSChorus application is configured to allow transmission of hashed user credentials upon user action without adequately validating the identity of the requested resource. This is possible through the use of LLMNR, MBT-NS, or…
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Low 3.2
Incorrect User Management
The FACSChorus software does not properly assign data access privileges for operating system user accounts. A non-administrative OS account can modify information stored in the local application data folders.
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Low 2.4
Lack of DMA Access Protections
The FACSChorus workstation does not prevent physical access to its PCI express (PCIe) slots, which could allow a threat actor to insert a PCI card designed for memory capture. A threat actor can then isolate sensitive information such as a BitLocker encryptio…
Revision history
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#1
Initial Publication
References
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ICSA Advisory ICSMA-23-331-01 - Web Version
https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-medical-advisories/icsma-23-331-01
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Recommended Practices
https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/alerts/ICS-ALERT-10-301-01
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Recommended Practices
https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/ics-recommended-practices
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Recommended Practices
https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Cybersecurity_Best_Practices_for_Industrial_Control_Systems.pdf
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Recommended Practices
https://www.cisa.gov/topics/industrial-control-systems
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Recommended Practices
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
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Recommended Practices
https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/tips/ICS-TIP-12-146-01B