Summary
The Berkeley Internet Name Domain (BIND) is an implementation of the Domain Name System (DNS) protocols. BIND includes a DNS server (named); a resolver library (routines for applications to use when interfacing with DNS); and tools for verifying that the DNS server is operating correctly.
Security Fix(es):
* bind9: bind: BIND 9: Denial of Service via 16-bit length truncation in DNS negative cache handling (CVE-2026-19667)
* bind: BIND: Denial of Service via crafted DNSSEC reply (CVE-2026-80274)
* bind: BIND: Denial of Service via malformed DNS64 responses (CVE-2026-19666)
For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.
Fixed packages 1
| Release | Package | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Rocky Linux · 9 | bind | 2:9.16.23-40.el9_8.10 |
Vulnerabilities 3
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High 7.5
Use-after-free in query_addnoqnameproof() via the DNS64 filter64 path
On a resolver configured to use ``dns64``, if an applicable answer from the authoritative server is malformed in a specific way, the resolver `named` process will exit unexpectedly. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.2…
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High 7.5
Remote assertion failure via 16-bit length truncation in `dns_ncache_add()`
If an attacker-controlled authoritative server can produce a negative answer that is exactly 65536 bytes, then a flaw in `named` results in a negative cache entry of 0 bytes. When this entry is subsequently read, `named` aborts. This issue affects BIND 9 vers…
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High 7.5
Validating resolver can abort while caching a mismatched NOQNAME proof
If a BIND resolver sends a query for a DNSSEC-signed authoritative zone, and the authoritative server replies with a valid wildcard answer and signed NSEC3 proof, followed by an unsigned NSEC at the same owner name, it will trigger an unexpected program exit.…