Summary
ComfyUI contains multiple vulnerabilities, with the most severe impact being that a remote, unauthenticated attacker could read image-decodable files and probe arbitrary host paths.
Vulnerabilities 4
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High 8.2
ComfyUI: Stored XSS via SVG file upload on the /view endpoint
ComfyUI is a modular diffusion model GUI, api and backend with a graph/nodes interface. Prior to 0.28.0, the /view endpoint served uploaded SVG files inline because image/svg+xml and related XML content types were absent from the dangerous-content-type handli…
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High 8.2
ComfyUI: Stored XSS via /userdata/{file} due to Missing Content-Type Sanitization
ComfyUI is a node-based diffusion model GUI, API, and backend. Prior to 0.28.0, GET /userdata/{file} served user-controlled HTML and SVG files with extension-derived content types, allowing stored cross-site scripting in the ComfyUI origin and access to brows…
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High 7.5
ComfyUI: Path traversal in /experiment/models/preview allows arbitrary image file read
ComfyUI is a modular diffusion model GUI, api and backend with a graph/nodes interface. Prior to 0.28.0, get_model_preview in app/model_manager.py joins an unrestricted filename route capture to a selected model directory without a containment check, allowing…
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High 7.5
ComfyUI: Path traversal in LoadImage via the /prompt API allows arbitrary file existence probing and image exfiltration
ComfyUI is a modular diffusion model GUI, API, and backend with a graph-and-node interface. Prior to 0.28.0, folder_paths.get_annotated_filepath and exists_annotated_filepath join workflow-controlled annotated filenames to a base directory without a containme…
Revision history
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#1.0.0
Initial publication