Weakness (CWE)
CWE-1422: Exposure of Sensitive Information caused by Incorrect Data Forwarding during Transient Execution
A processor event or prediction may allow incorrect or stale data to
be forwarded to transient operations, potentially exposing data over a
covert channel.
More detail
Software may use a variety of techniques to preserve the
confidentiality of private data that is accessible within the current
processor context. For example, the memory safety and type safety
properties of some high-level programming languages help to prevent
software written in those languages from exposing private data. As a
second example, software sandboxes may co-locate multiple users'
software within a single process. The processor's Instruction Set
Architecture (ISA) may permit one user's software to access another
user's data (because the software shares the same address space), but
the sandbox prevents these accesses by using software techniques such
as bounds checking.
If incorrect or stale data can be forwarded (for example, from a
cache) to transient operations, then the operations'
microarchitectural side effects may correspond to the data. If an
attacker can trigger these transient operations and observe their side
effects through a covert channel, then the attacker may be able to
infer the data. For example, an attacker process may induce transient
execution in a victim process that causes the victim to inadvertently
access and then expose its private data via a covert channel. In the
software sandbox example, an attacker sandbox may induce transient
execution in its own code, allowing it to transiently access and
expose data in a victim sandbox that shares the same address space.
Consequently, weaknesses that arise from incorrect/stale data
forwarding might violate users' expectations of software-based memory
safety and isolation techniques. If the data forwarding behavior is
not properly documented by the hardware vendor, this might violate the
software vendor's expectation of how the hardware should behave.
How to prevent it (8 mitigations)
-
Architecture and Design
The hardware designer can attempt to prevent transient
execution from causing observable discrepancies in specific covert
channels. -
Requirements
Processor designers, system software vendors, or other
agents may choose to restrict the ability of unprivileged software to
access to high-resolution timers that are commonly used to monitor
covert channels. -
Requirements
Processor designers may expose instructions or other
architectural features that allow software to mitigate the effects of
transient execution, but without disabling predictors. These features
may also help to limit opportunities for data exposure. -
Requirements
Processor designers may expose registers (for example,
control registers or model-specific registers) that allow privileged
and/or user software to disable specific predictors or other hardware
features that can cause confidential data to be exposed during
transient execution. -
Build and Compilation
Use software techniques (including the use of
serialization instructions) that are intended to reduce the number of
instructions that can be executed transiently after a processor event
or misprediction. -
Build and Compilation
Isolate sandboxes or managed runtimes in separate address
spaces (separate processes). -
Build and Compilation
Include serialization instructions (for example, LFENCE)
that prevent processor events or mis-predictions prior to the
serialization instruction from causing transient execution after the
serialization instruction. For some weaknesses, a serialization
instruction can also prevent a processor event or a mis-prediction
from occurring after the serialization instruction (for example,
CVE-2018-3639 can allow a processor to predict that a load will not
depend on an older store; a serialization instruction between the
store and the load may allow the store to update memory and prevent
the mis-prediction from happening at all). -
Build and Compilation
Use software techniques that can mitigate the
consequences of transient execution. For example, address masking can
be used in some circumstances to prevent out-of-bounds transient
reads.
Source: MITRE CWE-1422
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