Weakness (CWE)
CWE-25: Path Traversal: '/../filedir'
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that should be within a restricted directory, but it does not properly neutralize "/../" sequences that can resolve to a location that is outside of that directory.
How to prevent it (2 mitigations)
-
Implementation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
-
Implementation
Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
Source: MITRE CWE-25
4 results · Clear filters · Feed
-
Medium 5.3
Directory Traversal & Filesystem can be accessed by a non-admin user
Swing Music is a self-hosted music player for local audio files. Prior to version 2.1.4, Swing Music's `list_folders()` function in the `/folder/dir-browser` endpoint is vulnerable to directory traversal attacks. Any authenticated user (including non-admin) c…
-
Medium 4.3
Tsinghua Unigroup Electronic Archives System exampleDownload.html path traversal
A vulnerability classified as problematic was found in Tsinghua Unigroup Electronic Archives System 3.2.210802(62532). Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file /setting/ClassFy/exampleDownload.html. The manipulation of the argume…
-
Medium —
age vulnerable to malicious plugin names, recipients, or identities causing arbitrary binary execution
A plugin name containing a path separator may allow an attacker to execute an arbitrary binary. Such a plugin name can be provided to the age CLI through an attacker-controlled recipient or identity string, or to the [`plugin.NewIdentity`](https://pkg.go.dev/…
-
Medium —
rage vulnerable to malicious plugin names, recipients, or identities causing arbitrary binary execution
A plugin name containing a path separator may allow an attacker to execute an arbitrary binary. Such a plugin name can be provided to the `rage` CLI through an attacker-controlled recipient or identity string, or to the following `age` APIs when the `plugin` …