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Weakness (CWE)

CWE-337: Predictable Seed in Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)

Variant Draft

A Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) is initialized from a predictable seed, such as the process ID or system time.

How to prevent it (3 mitigations)
  1. Use non-predictable inputs for seed generation.

  2. Architecture and Design, Requirements

    Use products or modules that conform to FIPS 140-2 [REF-267] to avoid obvious entropy problems, or use the more recent FIPS 140-3 [REF-1192] if possible.

  3. Implementation

    Use a PRNG that periodically re-seeds itself using input from high-quality sources, such as hardware devices with high entropy. However, do not re-seed too frequently, or else the entropy source might block.

Source: MITRE CWE-337

4 results · Clear filters · Feed

  • Low 3.1

    Supermicro BMC's iKVM feature is vulnerable to KVM session hijacking due to a predictable time-seeded launch token

    The HTML5 KVM-over-IP console authenticates with a token returned by the web interface. Weaknesses in token generation may allow an attacker to guess the session token and take control of the KVM session.

  • Low 3.3

    Predictable Seed in Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) in the firmware for some Intel(R) TDX may allow an authentica…

  • Low 2.2

    cdo-local-uuid vulnerable to insertion of artifact derived from developer's Present Working Directory into demonstration code

    cdo-local-uuid project provides a specialized UUID-generating function that can, on user request, cause a program to generate deterministic UUIDs. An information leakage vulnerability is present in `cdo-local-uuid` at version `0.4.0`, and in `case-utils` in u…

  • Low 3.7

    enigmaX Scrambling Table main.c getSeed prng seed

    A vulnerability, which was classified as problematic, has been found in enigmaX up to 2.2. This issue affects the function getSeed of the file main.c of the component Scrambling Table Handler. The manipulation leads to predictable seed in pseudo-random number…