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Medium 5.3
Message parser retains every identical singleton RDATA, enabling wire-to-work amplification
In a query response, an attacker may send `named` multiple copies of a record that should only exist once (such as an SOA record). If the RDATA is the same on all the copies, the record is appended to the in-memory RDATA set, which can cause increased memory …
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Medium 5.3
Resource Exhaustion via Excessive DNSSEC Cryptographic Material Matching
A BIND recursive resolver may experience excessive resource consumption if it encounters large numbers of a particular kind of invalid DNSSEC record. Default limits on "max-records-per-type" and "max-types-per-name" help mitigate the exposure. This issue affe…
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Medium 6.5
Unauthenticated IXFR deltas are applied to the live zone before TSIG verification
For a secondary zone with transfers restricted by TSIG, `named` may start to serve the data provided in a zone transfer before the final message with the TSIG signature arrives. This could allow an attacker that does not actually possess a valid TSIG signatur…
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Medium 5.8
Out-of-zone database nodes can become authoritative zone cuts
A malformed zone may contain an NS or DNAME node above its origin, which `named` treats as a zone cut. If an attacker inserts a malformed zone into a BIND authoritative server (e.g., via zone transfer), queries for names inside the configured zone then lose a…
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Medium 5.9
checkwildcard() accepts an out-of-zone NSEC as a wildcard-nonexistence proof
An inapplicable NSEC record may be accepted by a `named` resolver as proof that no wildcard exists, which could allow an attacker at the same or an upstream level of the zone name to mask the existence of a victim's wildcard record. This issue affects BIND 9 …
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Medium 5.9
qpcache NOQNAME proof use-after-free crashes recursive resolver
An attacker may be able to cause a `named` resolver to abort. The attack requires inducing the victim resolver to send multiple queries for a DNSSEC-signed zone hosted by an authoritative server under the control of the attacker. If the auth responds with a p…