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OpenAdvisories
Malicious MAL-2026-10035

@wagni_bot/solana-sdk

npm package · versions 1.0.0, 1.2.0

Reported Jul 9, 2026 · Updated Jul 28, 2026

If this package is installed

Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.

Details

The npm package `@wagni_bot/solana-sdk` is a supply-chain credential stealer disguised as a **Solana** SDK. It is one member of a coordinated campaign of 25 crypto/web3 typosquat packages published under the single npm scope `@wagni_bot` on 2026-07-09.

Each package declares a `postinstall` lifecycle hook (`postinstall: node postinstall.js`) that executes automatically on `npm install`, before the package is ever imported. The script fingerprints the host and user (`os.hostname()`, `os.userInfo()`, `os.platform()`), walks the user's home directory (`readdirSync`/`readFileSync`) and reads high-value secrets — SSH private keys (`~/.ssh/id_rsa`), cryptocurrency wallet files, and `.env` files (API keys, tokens, seed phrases). It then JSON-encodes the collected data and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded Telegram bot via the Telegram Bot API `sendMessage` endpoint (https://api.telegram.org/bot8804087989:AAHUia-5DCloXsg9M9QhffTsHO5J_6FAxQM/sendMessage). All error paths are swallowed so the install appears normal.

codelake Research proved the packages belong to one campaign deterministically: the payload file is byte-identical across all 25 packages at each published version (version-lockstep), and every package exfiltrates to the same Telegram bot token — a single automated actor. Detected and classified independently from the live npm feed on 2026-07-09; at the time of reporting the packages were still live on npm and none of the 25 were present in OSV or GHSA (a first-catch).

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Source: amazon-inspector (e15edf4a83ab4894a29882072554e493c1673695d5e6aaa734672ba6da084112)
Package @wagni_bot/solana-sdk impersonates a legitimate Solana SDK but contains no SDK functionality — `main` points at postinstall.js, which is a credential-harvesting payload that runs automatically on `npm install` via preinstall/postinstall hooks. On execution the script recursively walks the installer's home directory, Desktop, Documents, Downloads, /root, and /tmp for wallet and secret files (id.json, wallet.json, keypair.json, MetaMask/Phantom extension storage in Chrome/Brave/Edge profiles,.env, seed.txt, mnemonic.txt), and reads SSH private keys (~/.ssh/id_*), AWS credentials (~/.aws/credentials), git credentials,.npmrc,.netrc, and Solana/Ethereum keystores. Collected file contents (up to 10KB each) are bundled with os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, and cwd, then POSTed in cleartext to http://107.161.90.180:7777. The package name typosquats the Solana SDK ecosystem to lure developers into installing the harvester.

Indicators of compromise

Shown defanged and not clickable. Search any indicator to find other packages using it.

URLs

  • hxxps://api[.]telegram[.]org/bot8804087989:AAHUia-5DCloXsg9M9QhffTsHO5J_6FAxQM/sendMessage other packages →