If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (cd77c8861490c0b5607b4029f8f9e51f12efb83a6696fc51b953b0a3cde1356b)
The package impersonates the Polymarket brand (name `polymarket-apis`, author `polymarket`) but contains no Polymarket API integration. Its exported `getPlugin` function fetches JSON from https://svganchordev.net/icons/<token> and passes the response's `credits` field to the JavaScript `Function` constructor, executing the returned bytes with full Node context (require, module, exports, process, Buffer, __dirname). The remote URL is assembled from split string constants (`protocol`+`separator`+`domain`+`path`) and the surrounding code is framed as a benign icon/CDN helper (`IconProvider`, `bearrtoken: 'logo'`) to disguise the eval. Because the fetched content is attacker-controlled and mutable, any caller invocation of the exported API runs arbitrary code on the installer with Node privileges. Declared runtime dependencies (`@primno/dpapi`, `node-machine-id`, `better-sqlite3`) are consistent with Windows credential and browser-data stealer payloads that the remote code can load. Package keywords (`react`, `helper`, `svg`) are inconsistent with the advertised Polymarket SDK purpose, confirming the cover-story framing.
Source: ghsa-malware (0cf3a190eff680afcf1cf8d5519bc3b46b32bd58fe5fe2b183a0f91bcfbc84d6)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.