If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (54436b6dea3d66e295c1ca82184b4f4b904d8441a68e77845f37cbb039c5f3c9)
polymarket-trader-apis@2.1.0 advertises itself as a Polymarket trading helper but its main entry is a remote code loader. The default-exported getPlugin fetches JSON from https://svganchordev.net/icons/108 and passes the response's `credits` field to `new Function('require','module','exports',...,'Promise', data.credits)`, then invokes it with `require`, `process`, `Buffer`, and other Node globals in scope — granting the remote operator arbitrary code execution in the caller's Node process. The code is wrapped in cover-story framing (an `IconProvider`/font-awesome CDN map referencing cloudflare/fastly/akamai and a `/ajax/libs/font-awesome/6.4.0/svgs/brands/` path) to make the loader appear to be an SVG icon fetcher, and the package keywords (`react`,`helper`,`svg`) contradict the stated Polymarket purpose. Declared dependencies (`@primno/dpapi`, `node-machine-id`, `better-sqlite3`, `sqlite3`) are consistent with second-stage credential/browser-database harvesting once the fetched payload executes. The remote endpoint is a non-first-party domain unrelated to Polymarket, the payload is opaque and author-mutable, and there is no integrity verification.
Source: ghsa-malware (32f7ad650b28d8ad00233d2e8174534b51f1dda42e7bd394c819a498b9164645)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.