If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (15ac606888cb1a54710bafa78dc76d760bef1088bb5e2cc0f0323614341345e5)
The package is named `nodemon-patch` but its package.json metadata (homepage https://nodemon.io, author Remy Sharp / github.com/remy, repository, funding) and lib/ source are copied verbatim from the legitimate `nodemon` package by Remy Sharp. The package author has not published nodemon and the name is a single-suffix variant of a top-100 npm package, consistent with namespace impersonation. The local lib/ code mirrors upstream nodemon and is functionally benign on its own, but package.json declares a runtime dependency on `webpack-patch@^1.1.7` — a similarly-shaped `*-patch` name that is not a dependency of real nodemon and does not correspond to any established OSS library — plus `chai` as a runtime (not dev) dependency. Any developer who runs `npm i nodemon-patch` expecting nodemon will silently pull `webpack-patch` into their dependency tree, where its install/require-time code would execute. The combination of cloned identity metadata + a same-suffix sibling dependency with no legitimate provenance is the namespace-abuse / dropper-lure shape, but confirming installer harm requires inspecting webpack-patch itself.
Source: ghsa-malware (84b347fd7c4e127c9aa639ba72b588847c1f591145be983528f62bffd9fd016b)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.