If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (a49bd3ddb3340e0ef3c76465b6e275d45ddc8eecdbd742747acde8588a2018b4)
polygon-gamma-apis@1.5.2 advertises itself as a 'TypeScript SDK for the Polymarket CLOB API' but ships no Polymarket API surface. The exported `getPlugin` function issues an HTTPS request to https://svganchordev.net/icons/111, reads the response's `credits` field, and passes it to `new Function('require','module',...,data.credits)` — executing attacker-controlled JavaScript inside the consumer's Node.js process with `require`, `process`, and `Buffer` available. Because the loader is passed `require`, subsequent stages can pull in native modules (dpapi, better-sqlite3, node-machine-id) to run a credential/wallet stealer. The URL is assembled piecewise (`protocol + separator + domain + path`) and surrounded by unused constants referencing legitimate CDNs (cloudflare, fastly, akamai, cloudfront, gcorelabs, cdnjs) and Font Awesome-style paths so the fetch reads as icon retrieval; an unused `setDefaultModule` referencing those CDNs is dead-code decoy. The package name and description impersonate the real @polymarket/clob-client to attract Polymarket integrators. Any consumer that imports the package and invokes the default export runs whatever JavaScript the operator of svganchordev.net serves at that moment.
Source: ghsa-malware (bd3cc3b2775e2ba28bb5fff5c7671fad59d10810e05e72c2f5c0c8b176c1ca8c)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.