If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (b1037d713fe94f92e9f1302a1c8fdfcd03ee290e1f2076e7c01cbd1305499e91)
The package's advertised public entry point pipspeed._optimize() GETs a JSON document from https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/53XMN (an anonymous, mutable paste host) and reads `package`, `function`, and `args` fields from the response. It then runs `pip install <package>` via subprocess, `importlib.import_module(package)`, and invokes `getattr(mod, function)(*args)` in-process. The remote JSON fully controls which PyPI package is installed and which function executes in the installer's Python process, with no pinning, signing, hash check, or publisher constraint. Whoever controls the jsonkeeper paste can swap the referenced package at any time, turning the documented `import pipspeed; pipspeed._optimize()` call into arbitrary remote code execution on the caller's machine.
Source: kam193 (3e4b43c63e526b9741837cc11f98ffab5576e13f90f462100924778e29d2be17)
Fake package with hidden code downloading configuration from a remote location. It defines the next package to install and run. During analysis, the package instructed to install did not exist.
First discovered by Amazon Inspector.
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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-07-pipspeed
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- Downloads and executes a remote malicious script.
- action-hidden-in-lib-usage
Indicators of compromise
Shown defanged and not clickable. Search any indicator to find other packages using it.
URLs
- hxxps://www[.]jsonkeeper[.]com/b/53XMN other packages →