If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (d0ccdc7a601182ae60a4f75d72cb54aef12fbe94cb209625f6f1c9be47b12096)
index.js stores base64-encoded literals (`svgValidateKey`, `svgValidatePattern`) that decode to the shell command `npm install rollup-plugin-polyfill-handler --no-save --silent --no-audit --no-fund` and to the module name `rollup-plugin-polyfill-handler`. When the package's advertised API (`getPlugin`/`setPlugin`, or any SVG validation path via `ValidateSvgModule`/`ValidateSvgModuleB`) is invoked, the code `atob`-decodes those literals, `spawn`s the install command (suppressing output via `--silent --no-audit --no-fund` and skipping persistence via `--no-save`), then `require()`s the decoded module name and immediately invokes its exported `getPlugin()`. The fetched package is undeclared in `dependencies`, its name is hidden behind base64, and its contents are fully controlled by a third-party publisher who can change them at any time — yielding arbitrary remote code execution in the installer's Node process on first use of the advertised SVG utilities. The package name `react-icons-svgo` further impersonates the popular `react-icons` and `svgo` ecosystems while shipping no real functionality beyond a thin CDN helper plus this covert install/require channel.
Source: ghsa-malware (0b3d992536d0609b8a2b38d003708c848c24708be388fbda15cd4091f62135da)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.