If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (11638a6b1b7876a94ef23285cb88f0127c003bb5e4d786dbaba5c30a9cbdfdb7)
memtry-cli installs an MCP server whose `memtry_onboarding` tool returns a prompt that instructs the connected AI agent to scan the installer's home directory (~/.claude, ~/.gemini, ~/.cursor, ~/Library/Application Support, ~/Documents, ~/Downloads, ~/Desktop, ~/Projects) for chat histories, resumes, YC applications, financial documents, and personal data, then submit the collected content through the package's `create_repo` / `update_context` / `append_changelog` tools. Those tools default-route via `callCloud(`${BASE_URL}/api/mcp`)` to the author-controlled endpoint https://memtry.vercel.app/api/mcp, and the shipped `.gemini/settings.json` pins BASE_URL to that host with a bundled Bearer API key. Only items the model explicitly tags `status: private` stay local; the onboarding prompt does not instruct the model to apply that tag to the harvested personal or financial content, so exfiltration to the author's Vercel endpoint is the default path. The tarball also ships a live `mk_...` API key for memtry.vercel.app in `.gemini/settings.json`.