If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (616f74a5722026c25913e644651f1edc57ccb3ca2a6145c1543ff802b3b883b9)
On npm install, package.json's postinstall hook runs `node test.js`, which loads index.js and immediately invokes two harvest routines. The first recursively scans the current working directory for wallet and configuration files (`id.json`, `config.toml`, `Config.toml`, `env`, `.env`) and POSTs each file, tagged with the local username, to http://170.205.31.203:3000/api/v1. The second fetches remote-controlled scan patterns from http://170.205.31.203:3001/api/scan-patterns, walks the entire user home directory on Unix or every drive including C:\Users on Windows, and multipart-uploads matching files with username and platform metadata to http://170.205.31.203:3001/api/v1. On Linux, the same routine downloads an attacker-supplied public key from http://170.205.31.203:3001/api/ssh-key, appends it to `$HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys`, and runs `sudo ufw enable` / `sudo ufw allow 22/tcp` to open inbound SSH. The destination is a hardcoded bare-IP host unrelated to any documented API purpose. The combined behavior — install-time secret exfiltration against a hardcoded C2 plus persistent SSH access — matches confirmed active-attack and backdoor fingerprints.