If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (84edc3b5fdf650aec875a1381b60bf2bb811f0c813ca6841052730fcee025bc3)
The package is published as an Airflow provider but ships no provider code. setup.py installs telemetry.pth into site-packages, which auto-imports _telemetry_init on every Python interpreter start. _telemetry_init spawns a daemon thread that constructs a client selecting a platform-specific asset (_PLATFORM_ASSETS maps linux_x64 → /pkg/package, linux_arm64 → /pkg/package-arm64, darwin → /pkg/loader_mac, win32 → /pkg/package.exe) and downloads it from a rotating list of anonymous Cloudflare Workers hosts (package-proxy.cf5oobworker.workers.dev, package-proxy.cf8oobworker.workers.dev, package-proxy.cf12oobworker.workers.dev, package-proxy.cf17-ddb.workers.dev, package-proxy.cf25-6eb.workers.dev). _telemetry_transport.py writes the downloaded bytes to disk, sets 0o755 with os.chmod, and executes them — on Windows via ctypes.windll.kernel32 CreateProcess with STARTUPINFO/PROCESS_INFORMATION buffers — with no hash or signature verification. A second delivery channel issues raw UDP DNS queries to 8.8.8.8/1.1.1.1 for TXT records at tin.dl.wel1.ru, tina.dl.wel1.ru, ldr.dl.wel1.ru, and win.dl.wel1.ru, concatenates and base64-decodes the responses into raw bytes — a DNS-tunneled retrieval path designed to bypass HTTP egress filtering. Identifiers and docstrings mimic a Sentry-style telemetry SDK (Client, Hub, DSN, Envelope, breadcrumbs) while the package's only functional behavior is the platform-binary dropper. Because the trigger is a.pth site hook rather than a lifecycle script, the dropper executes on any `python` invocation in an environment where this package is installed.
Source: kam193 (9b34b2a0cc52321dd89abbfd0036061560a1c0fa08f2a494a6a2a13566a8d84b)
Package presents little functionality, but excessive fake 'telemetry' module. This fake telemetry is used to download and run malicious executables. Code is designed to survive different blocks: first, there is an attempt to download the executable from one of five Cloudflare Workers. If it's not successful, the code falls back to download using DNS: first, it gets a TXT record from one of c.*.dl.well1[.]site domains, depending on the system. This record returns a number, which is then used to iterate over domains in the form <0...n>.*.dl.well1[.]site and reconstruct the encoded executable from their TXT records. The downloaded binary is then executed and removed afterward. Using a PTH file ensures persistence and runs on every Python start. In this campaign, versions 0.0.1 hold disarmed code (without the necessary configuration), which is completed in further updates.
This is a continuation of the 2026-07-haproxy-config-client campaign.
---
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-07-andreiiiiiii_i
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
- The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
- Downloads and executes a remote executable.
- covering-tracks
- persistence
- abuses-pth
- data-stored-in-dns
Indicators of compromise
Shown defanged and not clickable. Search any indicator to find other packages using it.
Domains
- package-proxy[.]cf8oobworker[.]workers[.]dev other packages →
- package-proxy[.]cf5oobworker[.]workers[.]dev other packages →
- package-proxy[.]cf25-6eb[.]workers[.]dev other packages →
- package-proxy[.]cf17-ddb[.]workers[.]dev other packages →
- win[.]dl[.]well1[.]site other packages →
- tina[.]dl[.]well1[.]site other packages →
- tin[.]dl[.]well1[.]site other packages →
- ldr[.]dl[.]well1[.]site other packages →