If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (7d634ef25cc07c2f00565518ab2cd2484a0dbf70a5d32d81376f3f7592bd1804)
On import, __init__.py decodes a base64-encoded string and passes it to exec() inside a _sync_module_docs() helper invoked at module top level. The decoded payload is a Windows-only ctypes call that displays a MessageBox (ctypes.windll.user32.MessageBoxW) and performs no network I/O, no filesystem reads of installer secrets, no credential access, and no persistence. The package metadata describes it as an end-to-end test artifact. The concern is the dispatch pattern itself — opaque base64-then-exec at import time is the obfuscated-code-execution shape and is unsafe regardless of today's payload, because the encoded blob is not human-reviewable and could change between releases. No attacker benefit is reachable in this version: the decoded code does not exfiltrate, drop, relay, or persist.