If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (0a543a55b463967fa7f6b3c1462ecb38735072a4f4f47bf5f9b732e089a64b8a)
The package advertises itself as an 'auth token handler' but its public API (src/ml_core_airflow_auth/__init__.py) exposes only a trivial in-memory TokenStore stub unrelated to the ~3300 LOC of hidden telemetry code shipped alongside. The setup.py custom install command copies telemetry.pth into site-packages; that.pth file contains `import _telemetry_init`, causing every subsequent Python interpreter start on the host to auto-load _telemetry_init._bootstrap, which spawns a daemon thread that constructs an analytics Client (Envelope, HttpTransport, ServiceDiscovery, DataScrubber, SessionTracker) and calls client.track('session_start') with the machine's hostname, OS, Python version, and cpu_count. The reporting endpoint is not a static URL; _telemetry_transport.py's ServiceDiscovery opens a raw UDP DNS socket with hardcoded fallback resolvers 8.8.8.8 and 1.1.1.1, queries TXT records under `0.<domain>`... `N.<domain>`, and reconstructs the destination via `base64.b64decode(''.join(segments))`, letting the operator change the exfiltration destination post-install without republishing. The name, generic 'Platform Engineering' author, and mismatch between the declared purpose and the hidden persistent telemetry framework are consistent with dependency-confusion targeting corporate ML/Airflow environments.
Source: kam193 (1b104d8446715fc7f59f0274ca3e655e6818b45edd837c24f78e857c917b2e6f)
Package presents little functionality, but excessive fake 'telemetry' module. This fake telemetry is used to download and run malicious executables. Code is designed to survive different blocks: first, there is an attempt to download the executable from one of five Cloudflare Workers. If it's not successful, the code falls back to download using DNS: first, it gets a TXT record from one of c.*.dl.well1[.]site domains, depending on the system. This record returns a number, which is then used to iterate over domains in the form <0...n>.*.dl.well1[.]site and reconstruct the encoded executable from their TXT records. The downloaded binary is then executed and removed afterward. Using a PTH file ensures persistence and runs on every Python start. In this campaign, versions 0.0.1 hold disarmed code (without the necessary configuration), which is completed in further updates.
This is a continuation of the 2026-07-haproxy-config-client campaign.
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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-07-andreiiiiiii_i
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
- The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
- Downloads and executes a remote executable.
- covering-tracks
- persistence
- abuses-pth
- data-stored-in-dns
Indicators of compromise
Shown defanged and not clickable. Search any indicator to find other packages using it.
Domains
- package-proxy[.]cf8oobworker[.]workers[.]dev other packages →
- package-proxy[.]cf5oobworker[.]workers[.]dev other packages →
- package-proxy[.]cf25-6eb[.]workers[.]dev other packages →
- package-proxy[.]cf17-ddb[.]workers[.]dev other packages →
- win[.]dl[.]well1[.]site other packages →
- tina[.]dl[.]well1[.]site other packages →
- tin[.]dl[.]well1[.]site other packages →
- ldr[.]dl[.]well1[.]site other packages →