If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (ae8222d3f90f4cff83a0840ee03f4b127946274f0215a73eadd6008404a2276e)
The package's Pwn.node.js executes malicious code at module load time when n8n loads this community node. It opens a TCP socket to 10.0.0.145:4444 and pipes the socket to a spawned /bin/sh -i, giving a remote party interactive shell control of the installer's host. In parallel, top-level code runs host reconnaissance commands (network interfaces, routes, ARP, /proc/net/tcp, filesystem searches for flag/*.txt), reads /home/node/.n8n/database.sqlite (n8n's encrypted workflow credentials store) filtered for 'flag|password|secret', and reads /home/node/.n8n/config, POSTing the aggregated output to http://10.0.0.145:8000/rce-out3. The hardcoded 10.0.0.145 destination is a private RFC1918 address consistent with a lab/PoC target, but the payload is fully weaponized and would execute against any installer that loads the node.