If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (82efbe82f1f4cdc513a33b4deeb7a811318155aaf4de1d4319dc54f8730f409b)
The package name matches Lyft's internal `python-blessclient` and is published on the public index as a dependency-confusion tripwire. `setup.py` overrides the `install` command class (`InstallWithCanary`) to issue an HTTP GET to `http://canarytokens.com/about/static/obeoafaz522zscu7248tqu4rh/submit.aspx` during `pip install`, and `blessclient/__init__.py` fires the same beacon at import time via `urllib.request.urlopen(_CANARY_URL)`. The beacon body carries only what an ordinary HTTP GET reveals (source IP, User-Agent); no environment variables, filesystem contents, or credentials are read or transmitted, and no code is fetched or executed. The destination is the canarytokens.com research service rather than attacker-controlled infrastructure. Installing this package discloses the fact and source of the install to whoever configured the canary token, and executes network I/O at install and import time without opt-out.
Source: kam193 (cce3c8791da7093bb0d6aaf8b79f49e5cbbcc4114f075f60121fc99b31c74e09)
Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.
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Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.
Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
- The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.