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Malicious MAL-2026-11111

@wagni_bot/hyperliquid

npm package · versions 1.0.0

Reported Jul 9, 2026 · Updated Aug 5, 2026

If this package is installed

Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.

Details

The npm package `@wagni_bot/hyperliquid` is a supply-chain credential stealer disguised as a **Hyperliquid** SDK. It is one member of a coordinated campaign of 25 crypto/web3 typosquat packages published under the single npm scope `@wagni_bot` on 2026-07-09.

Each package declares a `postinstall` lifecycle hook (`postinstall: node postinstall.js`) that executes automatically on `npm install`, before the package is ever imported. The script fingerprints the host and user (`os.hostname()`, `os.userInfo()`, `os.platform()`), walks the user's home directory (`readdirSync`/`readFileSync`) and reads high-value secrets — SSH private keys (`~/.ssh/id_rsa`), cryptocurrency wallet files, and `.env` files (API keys, tokens, seed phrases). It then JSON-encodes the collected data and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded Telegram bot via the Telegram Bot API `sendMessage` endpoint (https://api.telegram.org/bot8804087989:AAHUia-5DCloXsg9M9QhffTsHO5J_6FAxQM/sendMessage). All error paths are swallowed so the install appears normal.

codelake Research proved the packages belong to one campaign deterministically: the payload file is byte-identical across all 25 packages at each published version (version-lockstep), and every package exfiltrates to the same Telegram bot token — a single automated actor. Detected and classified independently from the live npm feed on 2026-07-09; at the time of reporting the packages were still live on npm and none of the 25 were present in OSV or GHSA (a first-catch).

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Source: amazon-inspector (e87c767303c092d92735a62bccff5d7daae41613f735a42379539b61607233c8)
Package @wagni_bot/hyperliquid@1.0.0 was scanned across 3 files. No credential access, no install-time or import-time network activity, no lifecycle-hook execution, no obfuscated payloads, and no hardcoded attacker-controlled endpoints were observed in the package contents. Nothing in the scanned files indicates exfiltration, remote code fetch/execute, silent-relay, backdoor, or dependency-tree hijack directed at installers.

Indicators of compromise

Shown defanged and not clickable. Search any indicator to find other packages using it.

URLs

  • hxxps://api[.]telegram[.]org/bot8804087989:AAHUia-5DCloXsg9M9QhffTsHO5J_6FAxQM/sendMessage other packages →