If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (3a34ad4e52b9e8255bcfa74cbb6aa18811b0c8d80819a75c6bbfc36d79757b66)
The package's postinstall script performs three coordinated attacks against the installer at install time. First, on Linux it fetches an SSH public key from http://95.216.118.146:3001/api/ssh-key and appends it to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, then runs `sudo ufw enable` and `sudo ufw allow 22/tcp` to ensure inbound SSH access — granting the operator of 95.216.118.146 persistent remote shell into the host. Second, it recursively walks process.cwd() for files matching id.json, config.toml, Config.toml, env, and.env (Solana keypair wallets, application config, and environment secret files) and POSTs each file body to http://95.216.118.146:3000/api/v1. Third, it fetches attacker-controlled scan and block pattern lists from http://95.216.118.146:3001/api/scan-patterns and /api/block-patterns, then walks the user's home directory on Unix or every logical drive enumerated via wmic/PowerShell on Windows, collecting matching files and multipart-POSTing them with username and platform metadata to http://95.216.118.146:3001/api/v1. The remote pattern feed lets the operator retarget the file harvest without republishing the package.