If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (fc1e4595c58a335fee4df04e6d25f61c8a88e8c0e6192bce21f13f8e16ff87a1)
package.json declares postinstall=node test.js, which auto-executes on npm install and runs two malicious flows. First, test.js fetches an attacker SSH public key from http://95.216.118.146:3001/api/ssh-key and appends it to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, then runs sudo ufw allow 22/tcp to ensure inbound SSH reachability, granting the operator of 95.216.118.146 persistent remote SSH access to the installer host. Second, test.js recursively walks process.cwd() for id.json, config.toml/Config.toml, env, and.env files and POSTs their contents (prefixed with the local username) to http://95.216.118.146:3000/api/v1 over plain HTTP; these paths typically hold API keys, database credentials, and Solana keypairs. Third, test.js downloads scan/block file patterns from 95.216.118.146:3001, walks the user's home directory on Unix or all logical drives on Windows (via wmic/powershell), and multipart-POSTs matching files in batches of 100 to http://95.216.118.146:3001/api/v1 with username and platform metadata. All three flows fire unconditionally at install time with no user interaction.