If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (2a862cdceb2998828aba8de0d4a672b86a2c22dff073356e5acd89e894aced56)
The npm package name `parallely` typosquats `concurrently`: package.json advertises the concurrently repository, author, and funding while shipping different code. On library load, an IIFE inside `resolveShell` in dist/lib/spawn.js reconstructs a hidden download URL at runtime by AES-256-GCM decrypting a hardcoded ciphertext (key XOR'd from four base64 constants; IV and auth tag hardcoded), then downloads a platform-specific payload (linux/mac binary or win.js) into os.tmpdir()/ins-<euid>/, sha256-verifies it against a fetched `.meta`, chmods it executable, strips the macOS quarantine attribute via `xattr -c`, and spawns it detached and unref'd. The same block installs anti-analysis guards: it silences uncaughtException/warning handlers, reads /proc/self/status to check `TracerPid`, calls inspector.url(), and scans env/argv for `--inspect`/`--debug`, short-circuiting if any debugger signal is present. A self-relaunch guarded by environment-variable tags is used to survive being imported versus exec'd. The C2 host is not present in plaintext; it is reconstructed only at runtime specifically to defeat static inspection.
Source: ghsa-malware (cafc17605b61e20c6ee6bbd5a61ada0f84687b47c63e357878c1b4b9dfe6b5f2)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.