If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
npm/@nebula.js/sn-action-button is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook (`"preinstall": "node setup.mjs"`) that runs on a bare `npm install`, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.
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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_
Source: amazon-inspector (3b32a43e23b6e2d22624436bb1f2038a31005ba8382d581bd2e1e8f46a7ee67a)
The package declares a `preinstall` lifecycle script (`node setup.mjs`) that downloads the Bun runtime from github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases (version pinned to 1.3.13), extracts it to a temporary directory, marks it executable, and uses it to execute a 727KB file named `math_init.js` located at the tarball root. `math_init.js` is not listed in `package.json`'s `files` array (which enumerates only `dist`, `api-specifications`, `core`, and `sn-action-button-ext`) and is heavily obfuscated using string-array rotation (a `WV8StW` push/shift decoder over a mixed constant table) and a custom base64-alphabet decoder. The advertised purpose is a Qlik Nebula.js UI action-button supernova component, which has no need for the Bun runtime or an install-time math loader. The package metadata claims authorship by `QlikTech International AB` under the `@nebula.js` scope, but the presence of a preinstall hook, an alternate-runtime download, and an undeclared obfuscated executable payload is inconsistent with authentic Qlik Nebula.js releases and consistent with a compromised-maintainer or scope-hijack publication. On `npm install`, the obfuscated payload runs with full Node/Bun capabilities on the installer's host.
Source: ghsa-malware (a0addaf6914b4daa9e94abf027df84c2088fa08c3383319b302194454cb5ddee)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.