If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (0ad6fd0f8ef16ee23b458b541d9cdfc73147e768ec9f8676ed50b30996231813)
postinstall.js runs unconditionally on npm install and harvests installer-side secrets before transmitting them off-host. Collected data includes host identifiers, contents/listings of ~/.ssh, ~/.npmrc, ~/.gitconfig, browser profile paths (Chrome/Firefox cookies, logins, key4.db), crypto wallet directory presence, output of `npm whoami` and `git config`, and a curated list of credential-shaped environment variables (NPM_TOKEN, NODE_AUTH_TOKEN, GITHUB_TOKEN, AWS_*, *_PRIVATE_KEY, MNEMONIC, SEED_PHRASE, API_KEY, etc.). The harvested JSON is exfiltrated over two channels: (1) the Telegram Bot API at api.telegram.org/bot<token>/sendMessage (bot id 7231970337, chat 7231970337), and (2) a POST to https://40f955f39128bd79-178-249-214-24.serveousercontent.com/collect. Execution is delayed 1.5–3.5s via randomized setTimeout, identifiers are obfuscated with random 3-letter prefixes, and the package ships a cover-story comment ("environment verification") plus a passthrough `module.exports = require('./index.js')` to appear as a benign SPL token utility. Neither exfiltration destination is related to the package's stated Solana SPL token purpose.