If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (fe55f411284226c68e60cbcae266a390a3ba0ef089a2a709363df3188130f605)
The package presents itself as an ESLint config / 'environment config reader' but on require() executes an import-time dropper. index.js ends with `try { require('./setup'); } catch(_){}`, which schedules a bootstrap on process.nextTick. setup.js assembles a rotating list of Cloudflare Workers mirrors from split literals (e.g. `["package-proxy.cf5oob","wor","ker.","wor","kers",".dev"]`, and cf8/cf12/cf17/cf25 siblings), plus a `*.dl.well1.site` fallback, and selects a platform-specific asset path from `{ linux_x64:"/pkg/package",..., darwin_arm64:"/pkg/package-arm64", darwin:"/pkg/loader_mac", win32:"/pkg/package.exe" }`. lib/telemetry.js fetches the response, base64-decodes it (`Buffer.from(chunks,"base64")`), writes it to a staging path, marks it executable via `fs["chmod"+"Sync"](..., 0o755)`, and executes it via `require("child_"+"process")`. Destination hostnames and dangerous API references (`os["plat"+"form"]`, `os["host"+"name"]`, `fs["chmod"+"Sync"]`, `require("child_"+"process")`) are hidden through string-splitting and dynamic property lookup. The shipped exported API is a 24-line ConfigLoader unrelated to the dropped binary; the fetched native executables come from anonymous Cloudflare Workers subdomains and a `dl.well1.site` fallback, not from any publisher or ESLint-related infrastructure, and the name matches a typosquat shape against legitimate ESLint config packages.