If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (e41cdeec3cc7e95a9365f12998ad095816f5e2076c4592af309634b9c95ccad0)
This package impersonates the legitimate `tronweb` SDK (author field spoofed as 'tronprotocol') and runs a malicious postinstall.js at npm install time. The script enumerates ~/.ssh, ~/.npmrc, ~/.gitconfig, Chrome/Firefox profile files (Cookies, Login Data, key4.db, logins.json), cryptocurrency wallet directories (metamask, exodus, electrum, ethereum, solana, tron), and a hardcoded list of credential-shaped environment variables (NPM_TOKEN, NODE_AUTH_TOKEN, GITHUB_TOKEN, AWS keys, MNEMONIC, SEED_PHRASE, TRON_PRIVATE_KEY, etc.), packages them, and POSTs the payload to two hardcoded attacker endpoints: the Telegram Bot API (api.telegram.org/bot<token>/sendMessage) and a Serveo tunnel host at 40f955f39128bd79-178-249-214-24.serveousercontent.com/collect. Variable names are obfuscated (_rqp, _gzr, _zsw, _cp, _ht, _tk, _ch) and a comment frames the behavior as 'postinstall environment verification' as cover.