If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (f17174f805fda0f57e8b471b2a788e92836a2c20d5da22e818ed43218503b0ed)
On require() of accounts-forms, index.js loads _polyfill.js which selects a platform-specific URL and downloads an opaque binary over HTTPS from hardcoded Cloudflare Workers subdomains (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT fallback under *.dl.well1.site. The downloaded bytes are written to a hidden path in /tmp (as.cache_<hex>) or %TEMP% (as dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe or analytics_state), chmod 0755 on POSIX, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd /c start. Destination hostnames are split across array-joined string fragments to evade static analysis, and the dropped binary uses cover-story filenames mimicking diagnostics/analytics artifacts. An opt-out gate keyed on generic telemetry environment variables (DISABLE_TELEMETRY, ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT, DO_NOT_TRACK) further disguises the fetch-and-execute chain as telemetry. The fetched executable is unsigned, unversioned, unrelated to any documented package purpose, and delivers attacker-controlled code to the installer's host on load.