If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (3106b53fed623dc791e285f0e6654a1ee066d92c9e2f2ca29752edcbaf050e5a)
On require() of the package, index.js loads _init.js which selects a platform-specific asset path and downloads a native executable from Cloudflare Workers hosts whose names are reassembled from split string fragments (oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, cf99-9b3, cf100-416), with a DNS TXT-chunked base64 fallback via *.dl.well1.site domains (tin.dl.well1.site, tina.dl.well1.site, ldr.dl.well1.site, win.dl.well1.site). The downloaded payload is written to a temp path under a decoy name (dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows,.cache_<hex> under /var/tmp on POSIX), chmod 0755'd via string-concatenated method name (fs['chmod'+'Sync']), and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c... & or cmd.exe /c start /b. The tarball also ships lib/telemetry.js (~81KB) containing a parallel dropper stage with the same primitives (base64 payload decoding, chmod 755, cp.spawn('/bin/sh',['-c',...])) wrapped in a fake analytics-SDK cover. Environment variables such as DISABLE_TELEMETRY/ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT/DO_NOT_TRACK are honored as a cover story to evade sandboxes and CI. The package name resembles a Tinkoff internal scope but the shipped code has no legitimate mobile-slider-icons functionality.
Source: ghsa-malware (69785265bba5b23cd4b5ea07bf6c96f53c2362514f882dd41eeac1792094f88c)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.