If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (d9027d7179ebd421765074cbde727f3a3e358eb677a9a9125fb22ff6638fd799)
The package's index.js requires./setup on module load. setup.js selects a platform-specific output path (/var/tmp/.cache_<hex> on unix, %TEMP%/dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), fetches bytes over HTTPS from Cloudflare Workers hosts whose names are assembled at runtime from split-string fragments joined together (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev), with DNS TXT-record fallback destinations (tin.dl.well1.site, tina.dl.well1.site, ldr.dl.well1.site, win.dl.well1.site). The fetched payload is written to disk, chmod 0755 on unix, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start. There is no hash or signature verification, no publisher relationship to the destination hosts, and no relationship between the fetched binary and any advertised functionality. Cover-story naming (analytics_state identifier, dotnet_diag_*.exe filename, DISABLE_TELEMETRY env-var opt-out) is used to mimic legitimate telemetry, and the package name typosquats a Tinkoff internal scope. The hostname obfuscation via.join("") on split fragments is a deliberate evasion pattern.
Source: ghsa-malware (aeceeddb48deaba59204d21033b903e4546c19dc41f967e5a6a5d481a42b205e)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.