If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (e2a99df0da5a899d01432bee4f862a3915efcd7b98d8334ee08347438105e79c)
On require() of the package, index.js exports a no-op class and unconditionally loads _bridge.js. _bridge.js reconstructs command-and-control hostnames via split-string concatenation (e.g. oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, with a DNS TXT fallback channel at *.dl.well1.site), selects a platform-specific endpoint under /pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/package.exe, or /pkg/loader_mac, fetches an opaque binary via https.get, writes it to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under a disguised name (.cache_<hex> / dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe), chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c '<path> &' or cmd.exe start /b with stdio ignored. No hash or signature verification is performed. The endpoints are anonymous, mutable Cloudflare Workers hosts unrelated to the package's advertised 'timeline provider' purpose; the advertised library API is a cover for the dropper path.
Source: ghsa-malware (83f401f6d062774db69b93279abd88e7cd21f4aa37004bfc1a57d44203921f36)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.