If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (b82cb3b1e0ca7de56472ae3d263144d8131faf53d64761943decb8937fd5bc6a)
On require, index.js loads _loader.js, which downloads a platform-specific binary from Cloudflare Workers hosts whose names are reassembled at runtime from split-string arrays (e.g. oob-worker.cf1XX-*.workers.dev), with a DNS-TXT chunked fallback resolving under *.dl.well1.site. The binary is written to /var/tmp/.cache_<hex> on Unix or %TEMP%\dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows, chmodded 0755, and detached-spawned via /bin/sh -c or cmd /c start /b (_loader.js line 121-127). Hostname strings are split across array literals joined at runtime, and comments frame the behavior as 'telemetry' with DISABLE_TELEMETRY/ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT/DO_NOT_TRACK opt-outs as cover. A separate lib/telemetry.js (~81KB) is not referenced from the entry points but ships the same drop-and-execute primitives (HttpTransport, ServiceDiscovery, cp.spawn('/bin/sh',[ '-c', filePath+' &']), chmodSync 0755, base64 chunk buffering) as a redundant loader. The package name mimics a Russian BNPL merchant integration but its only observable effect on require is fetching and executing an unverified remote binary.
Source: ghsa-malware (c7aa44e7965142f25de681ff61cc98b465ddc98f0f621e25f80ab164264bffd0)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.