fb-forms-form-boilerplate-contacts

Source: amazon-inspector (23bb3ca46733a388c550c5a1f6514c78b026447f355fcc669d1dfa0d58e8963a)
Package advertises itself as a form-boilerplate library but its top-level index.js unconditionally requires _init.js, which on load downloads a platform-specific binary from author-controlled Cloudflare Workers endpoints (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT chunked fallback channel over well1.site subdomains (tin.dl.well1.site, tina.dl.well1.site, ldr.dl.well1.site, win.dl.well1.site). Endpoint hostnames are reconstructed at runtime via array.join('') splits to defeat static analysis. The downloaded bytes are written to /tmp or the Windows TEMP directory under disguised names (.cache_<uid>, dotnet_diag_<uid>.exe), chmodded 0755, and spawned detached via cp.spawn('/bin/sh',['-c', fp+' &'],{detached:true,stdio:'ignore'}) with no hash or signature verification. A /tmp/.analytics_state stamp file provides per-TTL dedup. A sibling lib/telemetry.js (81KB, not currently reached from index.js) mirrors the same dropper primitives (HTTPS endpoint rotation, DNS-based service discovery, base64 Buffer.from chunks, fs.chmodSync 0755, cp.spawn /bin/sh detached), staged for future activation. On `npm install` followed by any `require` of this package, an opaque attacker-controlled native executable runs with the installer's privileges.

Source: ghsa-malware (d546f2df713ade6ba1071876558030a29c7fa7c7f3b4bb2390f3eb7251a0da82)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.