If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (2aca555e012d36b30d9ffe3d0f8acdca7ba67298a87ea02ea9d32731e8f2a748)
shift-sdk-v5@5.0.1 registers a postinstall script that runs dist/recon.js on npm install. The script collects hostname, username, SUDO_USER, home directory, working directory, internal network interface addresses, DNS domain (via dnsdomainname), CI provider indicators, the full list of environment variable names, and a filtered subset of environment variable names matching AWS, GCP, AZURE, NPM, TOKEN, SECRET, KEY, PASS, CRED, GITHUB, GITLAB, and SSH patterns. The collected data is POSTed over plain HTTP to the hardcoded bare IP 138.68.108.20 at path /cb. The package's main file self-identifies as `@shiftforex/shift-sdk-v4 — trading API client (scoped build)` while being published unscoped as `shift-sdk-v5`, impersonating the legitimate scoped SDK to attract installs. A `NON-SENSITIVE telemetry` comment accompanies code that explicitly enumerates sudo state, internal IPs, CI context, and credential-shaped env var names — pre-attack host and credential-surface fingerprinting against installer/CI environments.