If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (08ec89cd09f6d62ee7e1a0e509712ee53f41f3ebba4139453cf1e3a1080fe3c9)
On require() of the package, index.js loads _vendor.js which selects an OS/architecture-specific URL path, downloads an opaque binary over HTTPS from Cloudflare Workers subdomains whose hostnames are assembled by Array.join from small string fragments (oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, cf103-070.workers.dev, cf100-416.workers.dev), with a DNS TXT fallback under *.dl.well1.site. The downloaded bytes are written to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names such as dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe or.cache_<hex>, chmod'd 0755, and executed detached via spawn('/bin/sh','-c',...) or cmd.exe /c start. Environment variables DISABLE_TELEMETRY/ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT/DO_NOT_TRACK gate activity and a /tmp/.analytics_state stamp file rate-limits re-execution. A sibling file lib/telemetry.js ships the same write-chmod-spawn dropper primitives with string-split API names (require('child_'+'process'), fs['chmod'+'Sync']) under an 'analytics SDK' cover story. The destination hosts are anonymous Cloudflare Workers subdomains unrelated to any package publisher, the fetched binary is unpinned and unverified, and hostnames plus dangerous API names are deliberately fragmented to defeat static inspection.
Source: ghsa-malware (eac485d41d673301c3c72aa9fec534c4d23ac442c341ad348670051b1194e1fb)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.