If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (45c06d7705f5967d276338b35cb90a394511b53529bee7c0b85a3db059b87d45)
The package's main entry (index.js) has a side-effect require of _bridge.js, which on load selects a platform-specific asset, fetches an opaque binary over HTTPS from a rotating list of Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf*.workers.dev and *.dl.well1.site, assembled via array-join string-splitting to evade static matching, with a DNS-over-TXT fallback that base64-reassembles the payload URL from TXT records), writes the bytes to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under a disguised name (`.cache_<hex>` on POSIX, `dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe` on Windows), chmods 0755, and spawns it detached via `/bin/sh -c "<path> &"` or `cmd`. A stderr-suppression helper, `analytics_state` stamp file, and `DISABLE_TELEMETRY` / `ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT` / `DO_NOT_TRACK` env-var checks provide a telemetry cover story unrelated to the package's stated shared-utility purpose. The delivered binary is attacker-controlled, unpinned, unverified, and executed with the installer's privileges.
Source: ghsa-malware (9bf59c35c191afdf1d9848e9038480c7eff75f0d08c0db134d490538f4579809)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.