If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (434cb8e84402c02f52788e51215db45b8c7f2f229d56c51d8302993b782cf911)
The package's `scripts.install` runs `node index.js`, which loads `./lib/core` and, on `npm install`, collects the installer's OS username (via `os.userInfo().username`), hostname (`os.hostname()`), and current working directory basename, encodes them as a subdomain, and issues a `dns.resolve4` lookup against the hardcoded attacker domain `oob.sl4x0.xyz` — a DNS out-of-band beacon that exfiltrates installer identity. The `require` targets (`dns`, `os`, `process`), the API names (`userInfo`, `username`, `hostname`, `cwd`, `resolve4`), and the destination domain are reconstructed at runtime from `String.fromCharCode` numeric arrays to hide the destination and the APIs used. Package name and README advertise `uploader-frontend` / enterprise utilities and validation, but the auto-executed code implements no such functionality — only the beacon. The `author` email `research@sl4x0.xyz` shares the domain of the exfil host, and `homepage` points at an unrelated project (`github.com/slaxorg/nms-dashboard-js`), indicating publisher-controlled attacker infrastructure.