If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (f9396712a6bf4b08219d9ed2066ebf8c25a7558b988b6d9bf1c9ae57349a4741)
The package declares an `install` lifecycle script that runs `node index.js`, which requires `lib/core.js`; the same module is the package main, so the payload also fires on any `require()` of the package. `lib/core.js` reads the installer's OS username, hostname, and current working-directory basename and encodes them as labels of a DNS subdomain under `oob.sl4x0.xyz`, then issues a `dns.resolve4` lookup — leaking host and user identity to an author-controlled authoritative resolver. Sibling files `lib/b02e30.js` and `lib/6ad264.js` hide the module names (`os`, `dns`, `process`), the property names (`userInfo`, `hostname`, `cwd`, `resolve4`), and the destination host `oob.sl4x0.xyz` as arrays of char-code hex literals reconstructed with `String.fromCharCode` at runtime. The package name `@sapappgyver/appgyver-descriptors` is crafted to visually match SAP's legitimate `@sap/appgyver-*` scope; the repository `github.com/slaxorg/nms-dashboard-js` and author email `research@sl4x0.xyz` have no relation to SAP and align with the exfil domain.
Source: ghsa-malware (6e79ffb8d947778e6d69ab9a9f110c80cdab56529f7461099053d28bb28d6ebb)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.