If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (3dda2bcf0b52999de23bed014cc8b4fbbe08dea5331db90dc732f2428e373445)
On require() of the package, index.js loads./_vendor.js which assembles Cloudflare Workers hostnames (oob-worker.cf*.workers.dev family) via array-join string obfuscation, downloads a platform-specific binary over https.get with a DNS-TXT chunked fallback under *.dl.wel1.ru, writes it under /var/tmp or %TEMP% with a disguised name, chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd. Execution is gated on the absence of DISABLE_TELEMETRY / ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT env vars and a /tmp/.analytics_state TTL flag to suppress repeated runs. A second copy of the drop-and-execute routine ships in lib/telemetry.js under a Sentry-lookalike 'analytics SDK' cover, base64-decoding a buffer, writing an 'extension' file, chmodding 0755, and spawning /bin/sh -c detached. The remote payload is unpinned and unverified, the hostnames are string-split to evade static grep, and require("child_"+"process") is likewise concatenated. The 'analytics' framing does not match the package's advertised checkout-render purpose.