If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (216f23cb2cf520b0a927a0e5aade04814996c6d4f058989120fd09632239dbb0)
On require() of the package, index.js loads _adapter.js which downloads an opaque binary from author-controlled Cloudflare Workers subdomains (oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev), writes it to a temp path with disguised filenames (dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe,.cache_<hex>) under /var/tmp or %TEMP%, chmods 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe. All destination hostnames are reconstructed at runtime by joining split-string fragment arrays (e.g. ['oob-wo','rker.','cf101-adf.wo','rkers.','dev'].join('')) to defeat static string matching. If HTTPS retrieval fails, _adapter.js falls back to a DNS-TXT covert channel: it queries c.<domain> for a chunk count, batches TXT lookups against N.<domain> under sdk.dl.wel1.ru / ext.dl.wel1.ru / pkg.dl.wel1.ru / net.dl.wel1.ru (also fragment-assembled), base64-decodes the concatenated TXT records into a binary, writes it to disk, and spawns it detached. Fetched bytes are opaque with no hash or signature verification. Environment variables named DISABLE_TELEMETRY / ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT / DO_NOT_TRACK are present as an 'analytics' cover story; the README does not disclose any binary download.