If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (117b4f6c7e9e402d92085e427c4b40874e9b6838e16c15562408a0bda241f9ae)
The package presents itself as a UI dropdown library but on require executes _init.js, which selects a platform-specific asset (linux/darwin/win32), fetches an opaque binary over HTTPS from string-fragmented `*.workers.dev` hosts (assembled via `.join('')` to hide the hostname from static scanners) with a DNS-TXT chunked-base64 fallback to `*.dl.wel1.ru`, writes the payload to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under a disguised name (`dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe` on Windows, `.cache_<hex>` on Unix), chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via `/bin/sh -c "<file> &"` or `cmd.exe /c start /b`. The `require("child_"+"process")` split, the fragmented CDN host arrays, the.NET-diagnostics filename masquerade, and an `analytics_state` marker file provide cover-story framing. There is no pinning, hash verification, publisher-matched origin, or relation to a UI dropdown component. Installing or importing the package results in arbitrary attacker-controlled code executing on the installer's host.
Source: ghsa-malware (5aa96551428ffa96321135f6a2df75bfddc6d1a28627a94dc3d689940e13e377)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.