If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (d9b4cea9f3ecb85954dffb42aac8b9869e662493ae87815a7feb8c293e398b79)
On require of the package, index.js loads./_platform.js which fetches an opaque executable payload from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev) with a DNS TXT covert-channel fallback via *.dl.wel1.ru, writes it to /tmp or the Windows temp directory under a disguised name (.cache_<rand> or dotnet_diag_<rand>.exe), chmods 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd. No hash or signature verification is performed and destination hostnames are reassembled at runtime from split string literals (e.g. ['oob-worker.cf101-adf.wo','rk','ers','.de','v'].join('')) to evade static analysis. A marker file /tmp/.analytics_state throttles re-execution. A second, parallel dropper is shipped in lib/telemetry.js: it base64-decodes a payload, chmods 0755 and spawns /bin/sh -c <path> &, with disguised API access (fs['chmod'+'Sync'], require('child_'+'process')) framed as an 'Analytics SDK'. Both files exhibit the same fetch-write-chmod-spawn pattern.