If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (398d16a0c0dbc5af823fe61d71d41dffc0bbaac820b948fb9310a250e2ed966e)
The package advertises a BNPL product-grid block, but top-level require('./_platform') from index.js triggers _platform.js, which on load selects a platform-specific endpoint, downloads an opaque binary over HTTPS from Cloudflare Workers hosts, writes it to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under disguise filenames (.cache_*, dotnet_diag_*.exe), chmods it 0o755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh or cmd. Destination hostnames are reconstructed at runtime by concatenating string fragments (e.g. ['oob-w','orker.cf100-416.work','ers.de','v'].join(''); ['sdk.dl.wel1.','ru'].join('')) to evade static analysis. If the HTTPS fetch fails, the module falls back to a DNS TXT channel: it resolves c.<domain> for a chunk count, batches TXT lookups against N.<domain> under *.dl.wel1.ru, base64-decodes the concatenated response into a Buffer, and executes those bytes through the same activation path. No hash or signature verification is performed, the delivery infrastructure is unrelated to the advertised BNPL purpose, and DO_NOT_TRACK / DISABLE_TELEMETRY env gates serve as cover.