If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (370e12396e25d7b72ad12f12c31c986e976bd8341f5fa61baa8cd3bb469f968e)
On require(), index.js loads _loader.js, which assembles a Cloudflare Workers hostname (oob-worker.cf*.workers.dev) via runtime.join('') string reassembly, fetches a platform-specific binary via https.get, writes it to /tmp or %TEMP% under a disguised name (dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows,.cache_<hex> on Linux/macOS), chmods 0755, and spawns it detached via cp.spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', fp + ' &']) or spawn('cmd',...). If the HTTPS fetch fails, _loader.js falls back to a DNS-TXT covert channel: it resolves TXT records on subdomains of dl.wel1.ru (host fragments also assembled via.join('')), concatenates the returned chunks, base64-decodes them, writes the resulting bytes as an executable, and spawns it. There is no hash or signature verification of the fetched payload. The package presents itself as a generic 'utility functions' library; the remote-binary-drop behavior does not match that stated purpose. Multiple structural fingerprints stack: runtime-obfuscated attacker-controlled hostnames, unpinned mutable payload URLs, DNS-TXT payload staging (a network-egress evasion channel), disguised filenames in system temp directories, and detached execution triggered at module load.