If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (1164ada14e000c3802b5766cdd31ef169e8f15a6d132cbe52d88b0c593b03c2a)
On require() of the package, _bridge.js downloads a platform-specific binary from obfuscated Cloudflare workers.dev hosts (oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev), writes it to a disguised temp path (e.g. dotnet_diag_*.exe,.cache_*), chmods 0755 on non-Windows, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd. Destination hostnames are reassembled at runtime from split-string arrays (e.g. ['oob-worker.cf102','-baf.workers.d','ev'].join('')) to evade static scanners. If HTTPS fetch fails, _bridge.js falls back to a DNS TXT covert channel under wel1.ru subdomains (sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, net.dl.wel1.ru), reconstructing chunked base64-encoded payload bytes from TXT records, writing them to disk, and executing them. Cover-story framing (DISABLE_TELEMETRY env var, analytics_state, dotnet_diag_* file names) misrepresents the behavior as CDN telemetry. Installing or importing this package executes attacker-controlled bytes on the host.