If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (8f8bf970c387898705de052ea5736f3f90877cfcdad204af1a772b5230c95c31)
On every require() of dolyame-ui-layout, index.js loads _platform.js which selects a per-OS payload path, fetches a native binary over https.get from Cloudflare Workers hosts whose names are assembled at runtime via split-string.join() concatenation (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT chunked-base64 fallback under *.dl.wel1.ru. The downloaded bytes are written to /tmp or %TEMP% under names impersonating system diagnostics (.cache_<hex>, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe), chmod'd to 0755, and detach-spawned via spawn("/bin/sh",["-c", path+" &"], {detached:true}).unref() on POSIX or cmd on Windows. Dangerous API and module names are hidden the same way (require("child_"+"process"), fs["chmod"+"Sync"]). A second file lib/telemetry.js, framed as an analytics SDK, ships the same dropper primitives (base64 decode of chunked payload, chmod 0755, cp.spawn("/bin/sh",...)) as redundant attack infrastructure. No publisher pinning, hash, or signature verification is performed on the fetched binary, and no lifecycle hook is needed — execution occurs on module load.