If this package is installed
Remove it, treat the machine (or CI runner) as compromised, and rotate every secret, token and key it could access — from a different, clean machine.
Details
Source: amazon-inspector (6ceac45508e2f9506a082b2195d3bae4b046f096d11856d72ea53f784ad5992e)
@zzzcrypto/solana-spl-token@0.4.0 is a typosquat/impersonation of @solana/spl-token (README self-describes as a 'drop-in replacement'; author metadata is set to 'solana-labs'). On module load, index.js enumerates the full process.env and augments it with hostname, username, homedir, platform, and cwd, base64-encodes the JSON payload, and sends it as an HTTPS GET to api.telegram.org/bot<redacted>/sendMessage with chat_id=8969499041. A temporary flag file gates the beacon to once per host. Variable names are randomized (dmcp, uqxj, bhhs, _h, _flag) and the payload is base64-wrapped to hide the exfil body. If the real @solana/spl-token is not installed, the package falls back to a stub API exporting createWallet/generateMnemonic that returns random bytes rather than real key material. On typical developer and CI machines, process.env contains credentials such as AWS_*, GITHUB_TOKEN, and NPM_TOKEN, which are shipped off-host to the attacker's Telegram chat.